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Weldy 1
Chapter One
Research Question:
During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used various forms of
influence in order to sway the actions of their smaller neighbors in hopes of preserving existing
interests or creating new advantages. In particular, it is true that the United States has been guilty
of prying into domestic events in Latin America far before the advent of the Cold War. Part of the
legacy of American involvement in Latin America is the controversial role of the United States in
encouraging and supporting military coups in the Southern Cone and Brazil. These upheavals by
the military against elected leftist leaders resulted in destruction of democracies and the loss of
civilian lives through “dirty wars” and other crackdowns on left-leaning citizens by the military
governments. For years since these coups took place, the United States has been accused not
only of causing these seizures of power, but also of looking the other way while great atrocities
were committed by forces sympathetic to United States policy. In examining this controversial
point in American history, it is useful to examine just how much the United States is to blame for
Brazil’s coup in 1964, Chile’s in 1973, and Argentina’s military coup in 1976. What key
domestic factors pushed Brazil, Chile, and Argentina towards military coups during the nineteen
sixties and seventies? How did the United States use economic, political, and other influences in
order to encourage military coups against leftist leaders? Finally, to what extent, if any, are the
actions of the United States to blame for the launching of these military coups in Latin America?
Were these events caused in part or whole by United States manipulation of economic forces,
government leadership, public propaganda, threats of military action, and other factors? If not,
was the United States merely an ideological sympathizer to domestic events that were
homegrown due to traditional military roles, instability, political upheaval, or other independent
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factors? Were the actions of the United States necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the event
of successful military coups in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina?
Interest and Relevance
These Cold War era coups in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina stem from the numerous
important ramifications ofthe events which have affected numerous nations internationally.
Central to this study is the role the United States played in the execution and consolidation of
military coups. Undoubtedly, the United States’ complicity and/ or cooperation with the military
regimes relied on American fear of the perceived threat of international communism via the
domino theory, efforts to protect important American business interests, and a desire to replace
problematic elected leaders with more pro-U.S. individuals. There is much to learn from an
exploration of the actions that the United States was willing to take in supporting or encouraging
military coups against civilian governments in order to achieve a better environment for
numerous American interests.
Even more important to the nations in which the coups occurred, the subsequent military
regimes in the three countries executed major human rights violations that not only killed
thousands, but continue to affect national politics decades later. In fact, the cooperation of the
military regimes in efforts to counteract subversives throughout much of South America through
Operation Condor have been estimated to have resulted in the death or disappearance of over
sixty thousand citizens(McSherry 2005, 36). To this day, political and social groups in all three
of the countries in question continue their efforts to find truth and reconciliation with the
activities of the military regimes which ruled their nations for over forty years combined.
The importance of the studying these types of seizures of power in Latin America
continues to be demonstrated today. Although the latest end to the Cold War military
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governments occurred with the transition to democracy in Chile in 1990. the importance of
military seizures of power remains strong in Latin America. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela
attempted a military coup d'etat as a military officer in 1992, and has outlasted another attempted
military coup against his own presidency in 2002. Similarly, the current crisis in Honduras
demonstrates that the culture of military intervention in domestic politics has not completely
disappeared from Latin America.
Theory
V

In the lead-up to the coups in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, the United States took vailing
degrees of action towards the civilian governments to be overthrown. Among the available
means for supporting or destabilizing elected leaders in South America, the United States
wielded heavy influence in loans and other economic support via the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, monetary assistance to national militaries, diplomatic pressures,
personal connections through ambassadors and military officials, support of domestic political
groups and protests, military action, and numerous other meaningful resources. The United
States was more than willing to use these means in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, but the extent to
which the United States intervened and the importance of United States policy is unclear.
The best understanding of the importance of United States action is found in comparison
with existing destabalizing conditions within these South American nations which may have led
to conditions which could cause a coup. Various studies cast light on what domestic
circumstances influence the possibility of military coups in countries around the world.
Augustine Kposowa and Craig Jenkins note several risk factors including economic dependence
on exports which can cause economic destabilization, factionalized governing groups at conflict,
and the existence of powerful elites with vested interests to protect(Kposowa 1993.127-7).
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William Thompson cites economic deterioration, historical backgrounds fraught with coups, low
levels of industrialization, and dependence on fluctuation in international trade as domestic
conditions that increase the risk of potential coup attempts(Thompson 470-3). Certainly,
economic conditions in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina must be closely examined.
The fact that the coups in question were all executed by members of the military, rather
than political figures or rebel groups, necessitates an understanding of factors that encourage
militaries to take action in internal politics. In his work in the “Military Motivations in the
Seizure of Power', Martin Needier outlines numerous institutional military motivations for
launching coups. Central to his argument is the importance of self-preservation of the military.
Military commanders will launch a coup rather than allow growing political unrest to splinter
their forces, and thus, compromise national security (Needier 1975, 70). Similarly, efforts by a
civilian government to ally soldiers with its political ideology, or to allow power sharing between
a non-political military and armed political militias will often result in a revolt by military
commanders(70). Essentially, the military will act to protect its monopoly on power. A drop in
m ilitary spending, which could reduce the nation’s defense capabilities, will also push national
militaries to take action (70). Finally, Needier asserts that one of the most important motivations
for the launching of military coups is the perception by military commanders that the civilian
government is creating destabilizing political unrest. Thus, the military will preempt a possible
civil war and seek to stabilize the nation through its own governance (71). It is extremely
important to investigate the presence, or absence, of these factors in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina
during the years before their respective coups. An understanding of domestic problems that may
have influence the overthrow of democratic governance will help to measure the importance of
United States action.
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The level to which international actors can influence coups is addressed by Alan Wells in
his study of coups in post-colonial Africa. Central to Wells' argument is that military leaders may
be pushed towards launching a coup via changes in economic aid from stronger foreign actors
(Wells 1974. 874). Similarly, the author cites the importance of foreign aid to the military as
provoking a coup (Wells 1974, 876). The military may be prompted to action due to a need to
regain foreign aid lost by a civilian government at odds with a stronger foreign power. Clayton
Thyne of the University of Kentucky asserts that the United States has been very influential on
foreign coups via manipulations of both military and economic support(Thyne 2010, 5). Beyond
supporting military commanders in their efforts to launch a coup, Thyne also reasons that the
United States can help to prevent military coups by showing support of the civilian regime
(Thyne 2010, 7).
The works of Kposowa, Thompson, Needier, and others all point to important domestic
factors that influence the likelihood of coups. While Wells and Thyne incorporate the effects
which international actors can have on coups, their arguments are not without the understanding
that domestic factors are highly important in causing these overthrows of civilian government.
Thus, no matter what actions the United States took in order to destabilize civilian governments
in South America, 1 theorize that military coups would certainly not have taken place without the
complicity of numerous domestic actors. Thus, although the United States may have encouraged
or su pported the action of coup plotters, the civilian governments would not have been
overthrown without widespread domestic support for military coups. Essentially, 1 hypothesize
that United States manipulation was insufficient for the forcing of a military coup. Rather,
domestic factors were most important in forcing military coups. Similarly, 1 hypothesize that
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while United States actions were not sufficient conditions for causing military coups, the
presence of United States support for military coups was a necessary condition for their success.
Hypotheses:
United States actions towards the civilian governments preceding the military coups in
question were insufficient for causing the coups.
Domestic factors were most important in provoking the military coups in Brazil, Chile,
and Argentina.
Perpetrators of the military coups of Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1976
would not have acted to overthrow their civilian governments if not for a belief that the United
States supported their actions and would aid them if needed.
Research Design and Methods: Multi-case Study
Research on this topic follows the design of a mulit-case study. In depth historical
research has been conducted focusing on important details and events surrounding three
important examples of Cold War era military coups in Latin America:
Brazil:
The political crisis that toppled the democratic government in Brazil in 1964 began three
years before with a stalled government. In late summer of 1961, the democratically elected
President of Brazil Janio Quadros resigned his position amidst controversy. The leader, though
not a strong leftist, had recently established normalized relations with the communist
governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union (Quadros 1961, 26). This act, combined with
rampant inflation and other economic troubles, lost support for Quadros in congress. At this
point, Quadros resigned the presidency, hoping that congress and the military’s fear of
transferring power to his leftist vice president, and public support for him would return him to
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the presidency in a position of power. This act failed and eventually his left-leaning vice
president Goulart was allowed to assume the presidency under a parliamentary system; thus
limiting his powers(Levine 1999, 226). This situation continued until Goulart successfully won
a plebiscite by a large margin in 1963. This vote returned the country to a presidential system in
which Goulart's powers were increased, much to the fear of conservative sectors of society and
the Brazilian military. As the Brazilian economy continued to spiral downward and civil unrest
increased, the Brazilian military eventually seized power on March 31, 1964(Levine 1999. 233).
During the military government’s rule, as in the other countries included in this study,
widespread repression of opposition followers and leaders was common (McSherry 2005. 3).
Before, during, and after the coup, many United States interests were at risk and the U.S. is
known to have participated in events surrounding military rule in Brazil, though the extent of
involvement and responsibility is highly debatable. Thus, the possibility for meaningful study of
the United States’ role in encouraging and consolidating the 1964 military coup in Brazil is vast
and intriguing.
Chile:
The military coup of 1973 in Chile also had roots in economic failure and civil unrest, but
much of the events of the coup surround the presidency of Salvador Allende. Allende had been
elected to the presidency as a socialist president. Allende sought to lead Chile towards a path to
leftist socialism. This route involved high government spending, land reform, nationalization of
industries, and other policies that were contrary to both U.S. interests and those of many
conservatives in Chile (Pedraza-Bailey 1982, 40). During his administration, rising inflation, a
divided and sometime violent public, and alienation of the Allende regime led to a general crisis
in the South American nation. With conditions deteriorating, the military seized power on
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September 11, 1973 and Allende committed suicide (Kombluh 2003, 22). Thus. Chile slid under
control of an authoritarian military government. The anti-leftist oppressions of what would
become the Pinochet government were among the most violent and widespread on the continent.
Some estimates suggest up to one in forty citizens were put into prison without a trial and no less
than two thousand were executed (Zagorski 1992, 99). Even more than was the case in Brazil,
there are numerous events and documents linking the United States to the success of the military
coup. Once more, a great opportunity for analyzing the importance of United States support
and/or involvement in the events surrounding the military coups in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina
during the nineteen sixties and seventies exists within this Chilean upheaval.
Argentina:
Argentina in 1976 was experiencing economic decline and political division between
leftist and rightist followers of Peronism, a political movement based on the leadership of their
exiled leader Juan Peron. That year, the elderly leader was allowed to the return to the country,
only to die shortly after his return to the presidency. After the death of Juan Peron in 1974, his
vice president, and wife, Isabel Peron came to power. Isabel Peron was without meaningful
government experience and as violence broke out across the country, the rate of inflation rose to
its highest levels during the early months of 1976 (Robert 617). As the nation continued to
experience economic and politically inspired degradation and violence, conditions ripened for
the military coup that took place on March 23, 1976. This new regime would show extreme
violence in its efforts to suppress leftist political and military movements throughout Argentina.
Some sources have put the number of Argentine citizens that ‘‘disappeared'’ near thirty thousand
(PBS ‘Argentina Death Toll’ 1997). Significant information exists on relations between the
United States and the military government of Argentina during its reign, and investigation of this
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relationship will be quite informative in the study of the importance of United States actions in
the military coups of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.
In order to provide a more strongly supported conclusion on the importance of American
involvement in these coups, I focus on locating a chronological “tipping point" at which a
military coup was likely to occur. In finding this point of no return, I then look for changes in
American policies or specific events that occurred around this same point in history. This effort
helps to pinpoint exactly what the United States may have done to force a change in government
rather than simply providing a laundry list of American policy choices.
Similarly, the cause of the military coups in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina is clearer when
compared to one or more cases where the United States exercised similar influence, but a coup
did not occur. In using added focus on the “tipping point" of government failures and
incorporating a study of non-coups, my research yields a much stronger and more testable
formula for analyzing the importance of United States involvement.
Reasons for Cases Chosen:
The inclusion of the three coups selected for this study stems from several commonalities
and a few important differences between the seizures of power. All three military coups share
geographic proximity, chronological proximity within the Cold War era and 1960s and 1970s, the
presence of some level of United States support, efforts at combating leftist/ communist elements
of society, and a preceding period of economic and political turmoil. These similar factors
combine to make the study of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina a valuable effort in understanding
how the United States can affect coups by examining similar cases while detecting nuances,
inconsistencies, and differences in how American policies influenced domestic events. The
nature of U.S. involvement in each nation varies vastly from the other and this study of different
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levels of monetary, military, and other forms of assistance to three nations in which a coup took
place will paint a better picture of the importance ofthe United States' actions.
Units of Analysis;
This study uses several units of analysis. One major unit of analysis is institutions and
groups. This unit consists of political parties and groups, militant organizations, national
militaries, governmental departments and agencies, and other major groups whose actions are
important to historical events in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Individuals are also important to
this study. Leaders like Juan Peron, Salvador Allende, Joao Goulart, Augusto Pinochet, Henry
Kissinger, Lincoln Gordon, and others are instrumental in showing the depth and extent to which
the United States affected events in the countries in question. Finally, time is key as a unit of
analysis for at which the research will show what factors were most important in motivating the
execution of military coup d’etat at specific points in time.
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Chapter Two
Brazil 1964:
The Brazilian military coup that toppled the democratic government of Joao Goulart in
early 1964 serves as a valuable case for examining the typical causes of domestic military coups
discussed in chapter one. Like many other Latin American nations, Brazil had a previous history
of military intervention in civilian politics. Before the overthrow of Goulart, the military had
deposed civilian governments in 1930. 1945, and, to some extent, in 1954. The military coup was
not a new phenomenon in Brazilian politics, but the coup of 1964 is especially interesting
considering the higher level of United States involvement and the amount of time for which the
military continued to exercise control over the government. The motivations for the Brazilian
military coup of 1964 are typical of the Cold War, Latin American pattern: the installation of a
leftist president viewed suspiciously by the military, the advent of an economic downturn, and
destabilizing political unrest that prompts the military to act. In Brazil, examination of
declassified United States documents leads to a strong indication that United States policies were
closely related to the military’s decision to oust their president.
The road to military intervention began with the October 1960 election of Janio Quadros
and Joao Goulart to the posts of President and Vice President of Brazil, respectively. Quadros has
garnered 46% of the vote, while Joao Goulart, in a three-way contest, managed 36% of the vote.
The two men were inaugurated to their positions in January of 1961 (Roett 1972, 7). Goulart’s
leftward leanings were made clear on 1 May 1961 when he made a speech calling for “basic
reforms” and a constitutional amendment to free the government from its requirement to pay
owners of expropriated land in cash (Parker 1979, 22). As economic conditions in Brazil began
to deteriorate. President Janio Quadros announced his resignation in August of 1961. His goal
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was to resign in an effort to rally popular support from citizens, the legislature, and the military.
He hoped that these groups, fearing the more radical leftist policies of Goulart, would return him
to office with a wave of support which would allow him to rule more effectively (Parker 1979,
5). Unfortunately for Quadros, the legislature blocked his return to the Presidency while Goulart
prepared to take his place. The institution which did choose to oppose Goulart's inauguration was
the Brazilian military, an event which foreshadowed the crisis to come (Roett 1972, 7).
Eventually, compromise was reached with Goulart’s inauguration as President under a
parliamentary system. This arrangement weakened Goulart by dividing executive power between
himself and the Prime Minister Tancredo Neves. The leftist politician was inaugurated on 7
September 1961 (Parker 1979, 6). Much to the chagrin of the military and other conservative
elements of the Brazilian political scene, Joao Goulart managed to regain full presidential powers
via a national plebiscite in January of 1963 (Roett 1972, 8). With this act, the Goulart’s power
was secured, much to the disappointment of many military leaders who, in the context of the
Cold War, saw his leftist ideologies apprehensively . Thus, the presidency of Joao Goulart serves
as one of the first steps in motivating a Latin American military coup; the installation of a leftist
leader viewed with suspicion by the military.
During the Goulart administration, economic deterioration was important to a further
destabilization of Brazilian political conditions. Economic growth stalled while inflation rose.
Overall economic growth, which had risen to 10.3% by 1961, fell to 5.3% during the following
year. In 1963, the year before the military overthrew Goulart, overall economic growth had fallen
to a mere 1.5%(Roett 1972, 107*). Meanwhile, the sagging Brazilian economy heavily affected
growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita. While GDP per capita finished at 6.7% in 1961, it
fell to 2.1% in 1962. GDP growth per capita fell to its worst the year before the military coup. In
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1963. Brazilian experienced negative growth, with the GDP per capita falling to an increase of
-1.5%(Roett 107*). As early as March of 1962, a United States State Department document put
Brazilian inflation in the final quarter of 1961 at 50%(Parker 1979, 14).
The effect of a falling economy on the Brazilian citizen is seen well through figures on
the cost of living in Guanabara State. This state, which contains the important city of Rio de
Janiero, saw a severe rise in cost of living. In 1962, the cost of living for citizens of Guanabara
State rose by 51.5%. 1963 saw the cost of living soar by over 70%. Finally, the year of the
military coup, 1964, witnessed the cost of living rise by 91.4%(Roett 1972, 112*). Clearly, the
Brazilian economy had fallen into severe stagnation.
In response to the falling economy, the Brazilian government sought numerous reforms.
Under the Presidency of Quadros, the government a launched a major anti-inflation program in
March of 1961. The effort sought to cut government spending and devalued the Brazilian
currency by 100%(Roett 1972, 7). In November of the same year, under the presidency of Joao
Goulart, the Chamber of Deputies passed a profits remittance law which inhibited foreign
investment in favor of domestic economic forces (Parker 1979, 9). In December of 1962, the
government pursued a “Three-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development”(Roett 1972, 8).
As economic conditions remained poor, the Goulart government created agencies for price
regulation of essential goods in February 1964. Finally, mere weeks before the coup that
removed him from power, Goulart decreed the nationalization of all oil refineries and the forced
expropriations of “underutilized” properties at a mass rally on 13 March 1964 (Roett 1972, 9). In
the end, the Brazilian economy continued its poor performance while the enactment of many of
these laws by the Goulart government perpetuated fears of Goulart's leftist tendencies amongst
the Brazilian military and other conservative political factions.
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Throughout the administration of Goulart, the military often found itself in opposition to
the increasingly leftist policies of the President. After its failed attempt to block the inauguration
of Joao Goulart in 1961, these differences continued to compound until the military saw
intervention as the best option for stopping Goulart’s leftist reforms. As early as 8 March 1963. a
CIA intelligence memorandum referred to conservative elements of the military that were
beginning to plot against Goulart(Parker 1979, 40). It would appear that Goulart's successful
return to full presidential powers in January of 1963, long opposed by the military, pushed some
military leaders closer to the brink. Military resistance is exemplified by the short-lived revolt by
low ranking members of the Navy, Air Force, and Marines in tlie capitol of Brasilia in September
of 1963. Although they later surrendered, the soldiers in revolt briefly held hostage a Supreme
Court Justice and the President of the Chamber of Deputies (Roett 1972, 8). In October of the
same year, Admiral Candido Aragao, a known radical leftist, was elevated to Commandant of the
Naval Fusiliers Corps (Roett 1972, 8).
By March of 1964, the military was increasingly angered by the rising number of leftists
in the Brazilian armed forces. The military’s opposition to Goulart was solidified by an event
known as the Sailors Revolt on 26 March 1964. Over 1,000 sailors protested in support of eleven
members of the sailor’s union who had been arrested of their demands for improved living
conditions and political priviledges. After Navy Minister Mota failed to disband the rally
effectively, he resigned his command. Goulart replaced the minister with Admiral Paulo
Rodriquez. This appointment had been recommended by CGT,a major union for workers. Thus,
the appointment, which appeared to be driven by a left-leaning political organization, greatly
angered many conservative elements of the military (Parker 1979, 70). Finally, on 30 March
1964, Goulart gave a televised speech to 2,000 officers of the army, in which he allied himself
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with the soldiers involved in the revolt (Parker 1979, 71). As United States Ambassador Gordon
communicated to Washington D.C. on the eve of the military coup,“Goulart’s Monday night
speech...looks like the last straw”(ClA Ambassador Gordon to Dept, of State 31 March 1964).
With his embrace of rebellious, leftist, soldiers within the Brazilian military, Goulart undermined
the conservative leadership of the military and, in the minds of many leaders, confirmed their
fears about his leftist designs on power in Brazil. By 31 March 1964, the combination of a
military' suspicious of its liberal president, a falling economy, and rising political unrest pushed
the military towards intervention.
The United States’s role in the Brazilian coup is best examined via internal
communications between various departments and individuals leading up to the military coup. In
examining many declassified documents from early 1964, it seems likely that policy decisions of
the United States were quite important to the Brazilian military’s decision to oust President
Goulart. While it cannot be determined whether United States support prompted the military’s
decision, or visa versa, timing of decisions made by both parlies suggest a meaningful level of
cooperation.
When Joao Goulart was first inaugurated, the State Department saw fit to recommend
that the Kennedy administration maintain its contact with Brazil as if conditions had not
changed. The briefing memorandum stated: “...we propose to deal with the new government on
the assumption that there has been no break in the cordial relations between the United States
and Brazil. As for President Goulart, we are prepared to give him the reasonable benefit of the
doubt..."(Parker 1979, 7). However, as Goulart’s policies appeared to be increasingly tilted to
the left, it is likely that United States efforts to maintain positive relations became more dilficult.
In November of 1963, Goulart gave a speech at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Weldy 16
that avoided mention of the U.S. and advocated Brazilian leadership of underdeveloped nations
against developed nations (Parker 1979, 49). It is likely that this speech, when combined with
expropriations of U.S. business interest and other leftist policies by Goulart, helped to
significantly erode Goulart's ‘‘reasonable benefit of the doubt.
Certainly, by March of 1964, the United States’s stance on President Goulart had greatly
soured. In a National Security Council memorandum dated 19 March 1964, Goulart is described
as an. “imcompetent.juvenile delinquent, who represents a minority of
Brazilians”(Memorandum Chase to Bundy 3/19/64). In the same document, officials reason that
a communist takeover is “conceivable” and that the military, who is traditionally outside of
government, and traditionally conservative, is having its patience “sorely tried”. Undoubtedly, by
early 1964, United States policy had turned against Goulart.
In a cable sent on 27 March 1964, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon asserts that
Goulart and communist elements are working to “seize dictatorial power.” In the same cable.
Ambassador Gordon urged that the United States support a coup effort being organized by
General Castello Branco, recommends shipments of arms, gas, and oil in case of a coup, overt
U.S. action if needed to support the coup, and a strengthening of anti-Goulart forces in the
meantime (State Department Amb. Gordon Cable 27 March 1964). While these request are
alarming indicators of United States support of the military coup, they remain simple requests
and are not valid in showing significant U.S. cooperation with coup plotters unless the request
are fulfilled. Still, it is clear that American officials were considering support of a Brazilian
military intervention.
On the following day, 28 March 1964, President Johnson’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs communicated to the President regarding suggestions on Ambassador Gordon’s
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requests. In the telegram. Special Assistant Bundy suggest to inform Gordon of many questions
the administration has in relation to Gordon's requests (Telegram Bundy to President Johnson
3/28/64). In this document, the administration appears to question some of Ambassador Gordon's
reasonings, but states,“Make plain that fundamentally we share Gordon’s concern that he can
rely on us for effective action if worst comes to worst.”
Also on 28 March 1964, the Department of State sent the a telegram to Ambassador
Gordon outlining estimates on taking place in order to provide supplies of fuel to the Brazilian
military in the case of the military needing such supplies to successfully finish the coup. The
document also requests more information on,“status of Gastello Branco operation and...relative
effectiveness, actual or potential, of officers and key elements in the four armies and otlier armed
forces...” Perhaps most significant in an examination of the affect of U.S. policies on the
launching of the military coup, the telegram states, “hope you and ARMA or other key staff can
avoid direct contact with military plotters”(Telegram Dept, of State to Gordon 3/38/64).
Although at this point in time, it is not clear that the United States has chosen to fully support the
coup, it is clear that Ambassador Gordon and the military coup plotters are certainly in contact
with each other.
A memorandum of conversation among U.S. policy leaders at the White House on 28
March 1964 reveals the level of U.S. involvement further. The document reasons that the
numerous officials in attendance at the meeting agree that it is preferable to wait for Goulart to
be removed from office during the next scheduled election, but that this possibility is unlikely.
Special Assistant Bundy expressed that the United States military should not worry if the
Brazilian military is to act, but if the military does not act. Perhaps most importantly, the group
agrees on a cable to Ambassador Gordon informing him to “keep a high level of security in his
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contact with anti-Goulart forces’"(State Department Memorandum of Converstation 3/28/64).
Just as the State Department cable to Ambassador Gordon had shown, this conversation confirms
that Gordon was in contact with military plotters.
By 30 March 1964, the same day that Goulart gave his fateful speech allying himself
with rebellious leftist factions of the military, a CIA cable states that intelligence sources are sure
that a coup will “take place within a week*’(CIA Cable on Plotters 30 March 1964). By the
following day. President Johnson expressed his permission for the United States to support the
Brazilian military coup if assistance was needed (Johnson to Undersecretary Ball Tape 3/31/64).
On the same day, Ambassador Gordon received a cable entailing a list of steps the United States
would be willing to take if its assistance was needed (Sect, of State Rusk to Amb. Gordon
3/31/64). That very same day. 31 March 1964, the Brazilian military launched the coup that
removed President Joao Goulart from office, and established years of harsh military rule (Roett
1972, 9).
Clearly, the United States was involved to some extent in the launching of the Brazilian
military coup of 1964. As evidenced by declassified United States documents, U.S. officials were
in contact with coup plotters well before the decision to remove Goulart was made. Even more,
the day on which the United States confirmed its willingness to provide military support for the
coup, in case of its need, the Brazilian military launched the intervention. Still, further
declassification of documents must be completed before the true importance of United States
policies can be known. While the promise of U.S. support could have provided the final
motivation for the military to act, it is equally possible that U.S. support was triggered by the
military’s preceding commitment to overthrow Goulart within a week. Until more information is
revealed to the public, the only irrefutable truth is that the United States and the Brazilian
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military plotters were undoubtedly in close communication during the lead-up to the
intervention. United States policies were important to the military's decision to initiate a coup.
but their importance as a necessary or sufficient condition remains unclear.

Chapter Three
Chile 1973:
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The Chilean coup that overthrew the government of Salvador Allende in 1973 is the
South American case that shows the highest level of involvement by the United States. This coup
is important in that it not only shows the highest level of U.S. meddling, but because the military
coup led by General Augusto Pinochet ended a long history of constitutional democratic
government in Chile. Unlike Brazil and Argentina, which had recent histories dotted with
numerous military coups, Chile had operated democratically for decades before 1973. This
democratic style of governance was well entrenched in both Chilean politics and profesional
apolitical attitudes of the Chilean Armed Forces. The likelyhood of a military coup in Chile was
minimal compared to other contemporary Latin American nations. Thus, the high level of U.S.
involvement and democratic legacy preceding the Chilean case provides a meaningful
examination of the importance of United States foreign policy decisions in promoting a military
coup.
The road to the Chilean coup of 1973 began with the presidential election of 1970. The
results of the election on 4 September 1970 revealed that the winner of the three-way race was
Salvador Allende. The politician, who had run for president unsuccessfully in 1954, 1958, and
1964, won the plurality of votes with 36.3% of the vote. His closest competitor was a member of
the center-right political party Jorge Alessandri. The runner up won 35% of the Chilean vote
(Treverton 1976, 10). Much to the fear of the United States, the election of Salvador Allende
marked the Latin America's first democratically elected Marxist president(BBC Profile 2003).
Before Allende was officially sworn in, the United States was already at work in blocking the
Allende presidency.
On 8 September 1970, the Committee of Forty, an United States Executive Branch
committee for evaluating proposals of major covert actions, had begun discussing methods for
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preventing Allende's rise to office and had agreed that actions should be taken quickly (State
Department Forty Committee 9 September 1970). Four days later, in a conversation between
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger,
the latter stated,“We will not let Chile go down the drain”(State Department Helms/Kissinger
12 September 1970). As the United States considered potential actions. Secretary William Rogers
and Kissinger agreed that: “The President’s view is to do as much as possible to prevent an
(Allende) takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low pressure” (State Department
Rogers/Kissinger 14 September 1970).
By 15 September 1970, less than two weeks after the Chilean election. President Richard
Nixon had already ordered CIA director Richard Helms to take serious actions in order to
prevent Allende’s inauguration. The handwritten note by Helms records Nixon’s orders in notes
saying,“make the economy scream, full time job- best men we have, 48 hours for plan of action,
and $10,000,000 available, more if necessary”(CIA Notes on Meeting Sept. 15, 1970). These
orders reflect the United States’ first attempt to halt the Allende presidency. This effort.
codenamed operation FUBELT,centered on persuading Chilean officials to oppose Allende’s
confirmation in congress. As described in a cable by U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry in
September of 1970: “The political options hinge on a majority of congress voting for Alessandri:
He, in turn, would name a military cabinet, then resign after being inaugurated. The military
cabinet would call new elections for a popular runoff against Allende” (State Department
Embassy Cables Sept. 5-22, 1970).
On 25 October 1970, the Chilean congress confirmed the presidency of Salvador Allende
(United States Senate Church Report 1975). Much to the chagrin of the United States, Allende
was sworn in to office on 2 November 1970(Church Report). The United States quickly began
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efforts to find another path for opposing the Allende presidency. On 5 November 1970, Henr>'
Kissinger informed President Nixon that the dangers ofthe United States doing nothing about
Allende were more serious than a decision to take action against him (White House
SecreL/Sensitive Memorandum for the President 5 November 1970). The following day. at a
meeting of the National Security Council, the council agreed that overt actions should be
avoided, but other decisions were made that show the Nixon regime’s extensive efforts to remove
Allende. In a Memorandum of the conversation. Director Lincoln and President Nixon discussed
selling much of the U.S. copper stockpile in order to cripple the Chilean economy, which relied
on copper for 80% of its exports. In the conversation, Undersecretary of State John Irwin II
stated:
The problem is how to bring about his downfall. I would question our capability to do it.
Internal forces in Chile are the only way. The question is how best to influence the internal forces
to create the conditions for change.”(CIA Memorandum of Conversation 6 November 1970).
A quote by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird provides more insight into just how the United
States would seek to depose Allende. In the same Memorandum, Laird is quoted as saying:
I agree with Bill Rogers. We have to do everything we can to hurt him and bring him down, but
we must retain an outward posture that is correct. We must take hard actions but not publicize
them. We must increase our military contacts. We must put pressure on him economically..
(Memorandum of Conversation Nov. 6).
Clearly, the United States was interested in promoting a coup shortly after Allende took
ofllce. As Allende began to exercise his agenda, the state of the economy in Chile began to falter.
While much of the economic decline was due to domestic factors, the impact of decisions by the
Nixon administration is clearly shown. In fact, by December of 1972, Chile’s capital reserves
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had dropped from 343 million dollars in 1970 to only 45 million in 1971. While much of this
decline was due to Allende’s new policies of nationalizing foreign companies, a drop in copper
prices also hurt the Chilean economy (Time, Allende’s Troubles 1972). It appears that the
National Security Council's discussion of hurting the Chilean economy through actions which
would lower copper prices had been successfully adopted. Poor economic conditions in Chile
were exemplified in the third week of January 1972, when Allende asked foreign banks and
governments for a three year moratorium on his nation’s financial obligations. The moratorium
addressed obligations of around 3.3 billion dollars(Time, Allende’s Troubles 1972). Economic
destabilization was important to the recipe for military coups in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In
Chile, this economic deterioration was intensified by United States foreign policy.
Aside from Cold War fears of a Marxist president felt by the United States, Allende’s
presidency began to be increasingly opposed from domestic forces. Whether complaints came
from the public at large, or from factions of the Chilean government, much of Allende’s
opposition was based on the falling economy and some of his radical socialist reforms. On 21
May 1971, President Allende gave a speech in which he outlined his efforts to follow a “Chilean
way*’ to socialism. The next month, congress unanimously approved a proposal by Allende’s
Popular Unity movement to nationalize foreign-owned copper companies. Finally, on 28 June
1971, Chile declared that past copper company profits had been excessive. Therefore, the
government announced that the foreign companies would be given no compensation when
expropriated (Lawson). In response to disagreements, in January of 1972, Allende threatened to
use a national plebiscite to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in favor of a
unicameral “People’s Assembly”(Time, Allende’s Troubles 1972). In January of 1973, Allende's
Education Minister announces a unified national curriculum which was postponed under
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opposition from numerous groups including Christian Democrats, military officers, and the
Catholic leadership (Lawson 2009). President Allende was certainly active in launching major
leftist reforms in Chile, and these efforts earned him significant domestic opposition from
conservative elements of the Chilean political scene.
Political upheaval began early in the Allende regime. As early as 22 October 1970, Head
of the Chilean Armed Forces General Schneider, who had been opposed to a coup on
constitutional grounds, was mortally wounded in a failed kidnapping attempt (Treverton 1996,
7). While the United States had been in contact with some kidnapping plotters and sought to
supply them, the U.S. role in the kidnapping of Schneider has never been solidly proven.
Violence affected both conservatives and liberals. In June of 1971, leftist extremists murdered a
former Vice President(Lawson 2009). Castro visited Chile for ten days in September of 1971
(N YT January 26) and in December; thousands of conservatives, led substantially by women.
protested the Allende regime in the March of Empty Pots(Power 2002, 126). In October of 1972,
truckers went on strike for nearly a month in protest of the Allende government(Treverton 1996,
11). By June of 1973, a coup was attempted by segments of the military in what became known
as the Tank Push. While this coup attempt was blocked by General Prats, leftist workers did not
rally significantly for Allende (Childress 2009, 48). Finally, the foundation for a successful coup
was set when General Prats resigned as Defense Minister, and Pinochet became the head of the
armed forces on 23 August 1973(Huneeus 2007, 34).
By May of 1972, Chilean military generals had warned that the national defense of the
nation was being threatened by declines in domestic production and rises in the rate of inflation
(Lawson 2009). In July of the same year, the congress impeached Allende's Interior Minister
after he was found to have supervised an illegal arms shipment from communist Cuba (Spooner
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1994, 27). Conservative elements in Chile were certainly feeling threatened by Allende’s leftist
government. In January and February of 1973, Allende's opposition was seeking to gain
two/thirds in both houses of legislature. This eftbrt was pursued in a hope of overriding AIlende's
vetoes of legislation and removing the president through impeachment(Montreal Gazette 20
October 1972). On 26 March 1973, the Chilean Supreme Court classified several of the
president's policies as unconstitutional. The military’s opposition to the Allende regime became
clear in March of 1973 when military leaders withdrew from the president’s cabinet(Lawson
2009). By April, several members of Allende’s cabinet had been impeached and elements of the
military had begun plotting a coup (Lawson 2009). Allende experienced another major strike
from the opposition when the Chamber of Deputies, which the president had once threatened to
dissolve, published a resolution declaring the Allende government to be operating outside of the
law (Huneeus 2007, 36). At this point, it is likely that the military, which had historically avoided
political ventures out of respect for the constitution, reasoned that a coup was justified in
correcting Allende's disrespect for the same document. By 7 September 1973, the Army
(Pinochet not included) had endorsed a coup to take place on the 10*^ or 11*^ of the same month.
Two days later, on the ninth of September, Pinochet had agreed to the effort(Huneeus 2007, 46),
Finally, Allende’s domestic opposition culminated in the launching of the successful military
coup on 11 September 1973 (Huneeus 2007, 17).
It is apparent that Chilean factors were extremely important in leading to the coup that
overthrew the Allende regime, but United States’ policy decisions were also instrumental in
encouraging the opposition and destabilizing the leftist president. As evidenced by a CIA report
on its Fask Force's activities from 15 September to 3 November 1970, the United States was
extremely active in creating conditions for a military coup in Chile. The report states, “On 15
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September 1970, the CIA was directed to try to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende’s assent to the
Chilean presidency on 3 November.” The report also reveals that U.S. covert efforts, “centered
on overcoming the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military.” The
document reveals that CIA officers had contact with conservative elements of the Chilean
military even before the inauguration of Allende. The report details that a U.S. CIA officer in
Santiago had,“established contact with Chilean intermediaries or principals interested in
promoting a military coup.” While focusing on the unlikelihood of coming successes in
Operation FUBELT, the CIA’s original plan to prevent Allende’s presidency, the document states.
At the same time, recognizing the fallibilities of Frei, CIA focused on provoking a military
coup”(CIA Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities 18 November 1970).
The CIA report of 18 November continues to outline methods used by the United States
in its attempt to provoke a coup in Chile. United States dollars and resources were used to
subsidize an anti-Allende political group and its radio programs, advertisements, and political
rallies. Agents used direct mailing of anti- Allende foreign news articles to selected military
leaders, the Chilean press, and political leaders. In fact, the report states that, “...partial returns
show 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials, and similar items as a direct result of agent activity”
(CIA Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities 18 November 1970). However, with all of the
efforts pursued by the CIA to provoke a coup before Allende took official power, the report states
that by early October of 1970, a military coup against the president was appearing to be the,
only possible solution to the Allende problem (CIA Report of CIA Chilean Task Force
Activities 18 November 1970).
Allende may have been inaugurated successfully, but the United States continued its
efforts to destabilize the leftist regime throughout his presidency. In 1971, U.S. bilateral aid to
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Chile dropped from 35 million dollars in 1969 to only 1.5 million dollars in 1971 (U.S. Senate
Church Report 1975). In fact, total economic aid from the United States fell from 29.6 million
dollars in 1969 to 8.6 million dollars in 1971 (U.S. Senate Church Report 1975). The Nixon
Regime was clearly active in seeking to destabilize Allende through economic means. As
Richard Helms had noted in his instructions for action from President Nixon, the United States
was making the Chilean “economy scream”(CIA Notes on Meeting Sept. 15, 1970). Finally, as
an example of the extent to which the United States sought to destabilize Chile’s leftist president.
from 1971 to 1972, the CIA spent 1.5 million dollars funding El Mercurio. This paper, which
was very anti-Allende politically, was also the largest newspaper in Chile (U.S. Senate Church
Report 1975). During the presidency of Salvador Allende, the United States was undoubtedly
very important to the destabilizing political and economic events that led to the military coup of
1973. While much of the political unrest that led to the military coup was of domestic origin, it
must be examined with the knowledge that the United States was ever-active in funding and
promoting anti-Allende movements.
The Chilean coup that overthrew the government of Salvador Allende in 1973 is the
South American case that shows the highest level of involvement by the United States. This coup
is important in that it not only shows the highest level of U.S. meddling, but because the military
coup led by General Augusto Pinochet ended a long history of constitutional democratic
government in Chile. It is clear that the domestic factors for a military coup were apparent, a
leader viewed suspiciously by a conservative military, economic deterioration, and political
unrest all destabilized the regime of Salvador Allende and led to the coup of 11 September 1973.
Still, history shows that the United States was heavily involved in promoting and increasing the
potency of these destabilizing factors. While it is impossible to assign a specific value to the
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economic and political efforts undertaken by the CIA and other agencies of the United States in
promoting the coup, one must reason that the massive effort evidenced by the CIA report on 18
November 1970. when continued over the course of three years, undoubtedly affected the
stability of the Allende regime with great significance.
While the military would not have overthrown Allende if not for his leftist reforms, poor
economic performance, and inability to limit political unrest, conservative members of the
military were certainly heavily persuaded to launch a coup by actions of the United States. Still,
it must be noted that the United States began aggressive measures to provoke a coup as early as
October of 1970(CIA Report 18 November 1970). Regardless of its ability to affect public
opinion through agents in the media and political financing of anti-Allende groups, the United
States would have to convince the Chilean military leadership to act in favor of a coup. Even
with these efforts in full swing, the Chilean military did not take action for three years.
Therefore, one must reason that while United States policy had a powerful effect, it was not
sufficient for initiating a military coup. The coup of 11 September 1973 was essentially an event
forced by domestic factors, with United States policy serving as a secondary, albeit powerful.
motivation.

Chapter Four
Argentina 1976:
The military coup that took place in Argentina in March of 1976 toppled a civilian.
democratic government that had ruled the nation for less than three years. The brevity of
democratic government and the return to military rule exemplify the classic formula for the
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advent of a military coup. Unlike Chile, which had experienced decades of stable democratic
governance before the coup under Pinochet in 1973, Argentina had been ruled by the military as
recently as 1973. Furthermore, the coup in Argentina is interesting in that, of the cases examined
in this study, the Argentine coup of 1976 appears to have been the overthrow that was the least
influenced by the actions of the United States. This fact allows the Argentine coup to reveal the
importance of domestic factors in leading a military to take such major action in national politics.
The Argentine coup demonstrates the importance of destabilizing domestic factors such as
political division and violence, economic crisis, and a civilian leadership which is opposed by the
military. The Argentine coup of 1976 is the one case in which United States responsibility for the
overthrow is not evident.
The military coup that took place in March of 1976 had its foundations in the political
career of Juan Peron. Peron, who had taken part in a previous military coup in 1943, was first
elected to the presidency in 1946. The leader ruled the nation under a populist political ideology
that combined many tenants of both left and right-wing political ideals (Cavendish 2005).
Avoiding entanglement in the Cold War, the new president advocated social justice for workers
while pursuing industrialization, improvements in infrastructure, and economic independence for
the Argentine state (Rock 1993, 227). Peron’s political party was heavily dependent upon his
personal leadership, which united elements of the political right and left. This reality would be
extremely influential in the unrest of the 1970s, as left and right wing elements of the Peronist
political movement began to clash following his death. Peron was re-elected in 1952, but
numerous problems during his second term ended his rule. After the death of his wife Eva Peron,
who was important in securing support of the lower classes, his questionable relationship with a
young girl, economic downturns, and his efforts to separate church and state, Juan Peron was
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deposed by a military coup on September 16, 1955. After barely escaping with his life, the
former president was exiled to Spain (Cavendish 2005). Peron’s return to Argentine politics in
1973 would follow a similar path of destabilization and prompt yet another return to military
government.
During Peron's exile in Spain, Argentina continued to be dominated by on and off
instances of civilian or military rule. In fact, the military intervened in governance in 1955, 1962,
and 1966. During this period, many political parties and groups continued their support of the
ousted President Juan Peron. By 1971. it was becoming clear that the political mobilization of
the Argentine public was becoming increasingly linked with the politics of Juan Peron and his
Peronist political movement(Romero 2002, 191). As movements for a return to democracy grew
stronger in March of 1971, the President under the military regime, Alejandro Lanusse removed
the military’s ban on activity of political parties and issued a call for new democratic elections
(Romero 2002, 194). Juan Peron, while still in Spain, prepared for a return to politics by naming
politician Hector J. Campora as his new personal emissary in November of 1971 (Romero 2002,
195). By the time elections came to pass in early 1973, Peronist Hector J. Campora was elected
to the Presidency and was inaugurated on 25 May 1973(Romero 2002, 196).
Peron took action swiftly. With a Peronist president now in office, Juan Peron returned to
Argentina on 20 June 1973 to be greeted by thousands of excited supporters(Romero 2002,
203). Less than a month later, on 12 July, Hector Campora resigned from the presidency, starting
a process for new presidential elections to occur in September of the same year (Telia 58). The
election, which occurred on 23 September of 1973, saw Juan Peron elected by an overwhelming
65.1% of the Argentine vote (Telia 1983, 60). Unfortunately, the popular election of a widely
supported president did not bring stability to Argentina. Political division, which had dominated
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the nation ever since Peron was first exiled, continued to create serious problems for democratic
governance. When coupled with economic deterioration and the ineffective leadership of Peron's
vice president following his unexpected death on 1 July 1974,this political division pushed the
nation towards yet another military coup (Telia 1983, 68).
The fact that the Peronist movement managed to attract elements of both left and right
wing political ideologies meant that confrontation was largely unavoidable as different factions
jostled for power. As early as May of 1969, political upheaval was active. On the 29*^ of that
month, the largest Argentine union, the CGT, initiated a major strike in the city of Cordoba.
Known as the Cordobazo, this strike by students and workers was put down firmly, with dozens
killed and close to 500 protesters wounded (Romero 2002, 181). Throughout 1971 and 1972,
these style of protests continued to spread across the country in major areas such as General
Roca, Neuquen, Mendoza, and other cities(Romero 2002, 183). One of the strongest examples
of the splintering factions of the Peronist movement was evident upon Peron’s return to
Argentina on 20 June 1973, As the politician greeted thousands of supporters at the Ezeiza
airport, camouflaged elements of the right-wing Peronist Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, or
Triple-A, death squads opened fire on left-wing Peronists in the crowd, killing thirteen and
wounding around 300(Romero 2002, 203). By May of 1974, both the People’s Revolutionary
Army(ERP)and the Montoneros, both left wing Peronist factions, were banned by the Peron
administration for their violent actions (Telia 1983, 64). Political division became so serious that
less than a month before his death. On 12 June 1974, President Juan Peron addressed a massive
demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo. In his address, the president called for restraint and
discipline among the quarreling factions, less he resign the presidency (Romero 2002, 208).
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Resignation would be unnecessary however, as the President, aged 78 years, fell sick and passed
away on 1 July 1974 (Telia 1983. 68).
With the death of the President who had sought to unite various battling elements of his
own political movement, the political unrest that had destabilized the nation in the past became
increasingly violent and unmanageable for the civilian government. Added to this situation was
Isabel PeroiTs rise to the presidency. Unlike her husband, Isabel had virtually no political
experience, and no ability to retain the uniting qualities of Juan’s Peronist movement. In this
environment, the violent attack by the Triple- A at Ezeiza airport in June of 1973 opened the
floodgates to widespread political violence executed by both right and left-wing elements ofthe
Argentine political spectrum. In this attack by the right-wing terror group, members of the
Triple-A opened fire on left leaning Peronists at a rally welcoming the leader’s return. This
increase in violence began the road to the military coup of 1976 by introducing the presence of
destabilizing political division to the recipe for a failure of civilian government. It is important to
note that no evidence has been found linking the United States to any of the actions of these
militant political groups.
Only a month after the death of President Juan Peron, the ERP announced the formation
of the Revolutionary Coordinating Council. This group included leftist revolutionary groups
from Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile. Although their efforts would be cut short by the
coup in 1976, this group began plans to unite guerilla groups from both Argentina and Uruguay
to continue their armed struggle (Heinz 1999, 236). In September of 1974, the Montoneros. a
left-wing terror group which had gone underground following the death of Juan Peron, publicly
declared that it would resume the armed struggle (Telia 1983, 72). As political violence increased
by both right and left-wing groups, some of the best information on the magnitude of attacks is
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shown through United States State Department communications on reports of violence.
According to a communication to Washington dated 28 January 1975, the Triple-A bombed the
printing facilities of La Voz Del Interior newspaper in Cordoba on 23 January of the same year
(CIA Newspaper Bombed Message 613, 1975). One document sent to Washington from a U.S.
embassy official named Beckett contains a substantial list of instances of violence during the first
month of 1975. Among other attacks, the report details: the machine-gunning of a police officer
on the 3'^’. an attack on a police station by 24 uniformed militants on the 20*. an ERP seizure of a
television station to broadcast propaganda also on the 20*. the assassination of a local official on
the 24*. a bomb attack on El Diario newspaper on the 25*. and numerous other killings,
robberies, kidnappings, and other attacks by both left and right-wing groups(CIA Overview of
Terrorist Situation in Argentina message 698, 1975). The declassified documents continue to
testify to the severity of political violence sweeping Argentina during the years before the
military coup. On 14 February 1975, three Montoneros gunmen were reported to have
assassinate Argentine National Deputy Hipolito Acuna(CIA Assassination of National Deputy
message 1144. 1975. The United States, which would later support the actions of the military
coup, was likely motivated in part by the kidnapping and murder of U.S. Consular Agent John
Patrick Egan in late February of 1975. Egan, who was forcibly removed from his home in front
of his wife, was confirmed to have been taken by members of the Montoneros(CIA Kidnapping
of U.S. Official message 1316, 1975).
fhe overall cost of the political violence that increasingly dominated Argentine political
life following the death of Juan Peron is shown by later State Department communications. One
document entitled “Rising Toll of Terrorism” states that during the first two weeks of October of
1975, violence had reached all new highs. By the date of the document's creation 15 October
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1975. battles between Argentine security forces and militant political groups had resulted in at
least seven major clashes, resulting in at least 110 people killed (CIA Rising Toll of Terrorism
message 6856. 1975). Over the weekend of October 14-17 1975, two business executives were
kidnapped, five federal police officers were killed, an Assistant Federal Police Chief was nearly
assassinated, and four other government security personnel were killed through political violence
(CIA Continuing Terrorism Problems message 7119, 1975). Clearly, destabilizing political
violence was on the rise.
On 14 December 1975. the power and audacity of terrorist groups was made clear. Highly
trained Montoneros frogmen swam to the Naval yacht Itati, where they planted explosives in an
attempt to assassinate the Commander in Chief of the Argentine Navy. Although Admiral Emilio
Massera was not injured by the explosion, the yacht was heavily damaged and the resolve of
Argentine militant groups was undoubtable (Spencer 1996, 134). In all, the year 1975 saw close
to nine-hundred citizens killed due to political violence (Peter 1976, 617). In the final year
leading up to the military coup, 1975-76, 293 Argentine police and military personnel were
killed. In 1 976 alone, at least 156 servicemen were claimed by the political violence (Wright
2007, 102). While the United States remained uninvolved in the support of either side of the
battling factions, it is likely that this remarkable surge in violence, which resulted in the murder
of at least one U.S. consular agent, a rise in communist-inspired militant activity, and an
atmosphere of danger for U.S. business interests, created a situation in which the United States
would react positively to the possibility of a coming military coup.
While politically motivated violence swept much of the country, the falling state of the
Argentine economy initiated further destabilization of the democratic regime. By March of 1975,
the civilian government had enacted a devaluation of the currency in order to combat growing
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inflation. As a result, numerous unions and other workers' groups began demanding large
increases in wages (Telia 1983. 75). Inflation rates from May of 1975 through May of 1976 have
been cited at levels as high as 954%(Telia 1983. 125). The government devalued the currency by
100% in the middle months of 1975 and increased public-sector prices on goods by 200% (Telia
1983, 76). Inflation during 1975 reached 334.8%, putting great strains on the Argentine public
and furthering their dissatisfaction with the current government(Peter 1976,217). Finally,
underlining the state of the Argentine economy during the closest years before the military coup,
unemployment figures in the Greater Buenos Aires area doubled between April of 1975 to April
of 1976 (Telia 1983. 126). It has been seen through the Brazilian coup of 1964 and the Chilean
case of 1973 that economic deterioration is strong factor in motivating military seizures of
power, and the Argentine case of 1976 proves to follow the same formula.
In both previous cases of Cold War military coups in the Southern Cone, the military has
been motivated to remove a leader that if feels is leading the nation towards a state of failure. In
the case of Argentina in 1976, this important motivation for a military coup is also present. The
death of Juan Pcron left the presidency in the hands of his running mate and wife, Isabel Peron.
Unlike his previous wife Evita, Isabel held less charismatic sway over the Argentine people, and
her leadership initiated a downward spiral that eventually prompted the military to take decisive
action.
The leadership of Isabel Peron was largely unable to effectively deal with the wealth of
problems addressing the nation. Juan’s second wife, who had held no previous political
experience, was simply unqualified for the job. As her presidency continued following the death
of Juan Peron, it became increasingly clear that a wealth of decisions were being made by one of
her advisors. Minister of Social Welfare Jose Lopez Rega. This politician, the very man who
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secretly led the right-wing death squads of the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance, came to
exercise far more power than was constitutionally his as he greatly influenced the decision
making of the Isabel Peron regime. By mid-July 1975, public outrage at the role of Rega resulted
in protests in front of his office and his swift flight to Spain to fulfill a new role as ambassador
(Lewis 2002. 160). By the advent of June 1975, the Isabel Peron regime's failure to effectively
deal with economic problems and willingness to support the Triple-A and sweeping military
efforts against left-leaning Peronists meant that, in addition to much of the public, military and
business leaders were no longer willing to express strong support for her presidency(Romero
2002. 14). As conditions deteriorated further, Isabel Peron announced a leave of absence on 13
September 1975. leaving a more moderate peronist Italo Luder in charge (Romero 2002, 214).
After a period of calming tensions, Isabel announced her return to the presidency on 5 October
1975 (Telia 1983, 79). At this point, the problems of violent political upheaval, economic
collapse, and a leader not trusted by the military due to her poor leadership had been pushed to
the boiling point. Without meaningful changes over the course of the following months, the
Argentine military again returned to power following a military coup launched on 24 March
1976.
The United States had several reasons to support a coup in Argentina. First, the dramatic
rise in violence by both left and right-wing factions of Peronists destabilized the nation to a point
where foreign investment was made both difficult and outright dangerous. Furthermore, the
violence had already claimed at least one U.S. consular agent, obviously making diplomatic
activity perilous for American citizens. The economic crisis further hurt prospects of meaningful
economic activity between the two nations, and the effective leadership of a military regime
would provide a path to remedy these problems. While the motive for U.S. involvement is clear.

Weldy 37

evidence of meaningful U.S. activities in promoting the coup simply do not exist. Declassified
American documents show that the U.S. certainly had foreknowledge ofthe coup, but not a
participatory role in forcing the overthrow.
One of the first allusions to a coming military coup is evident in a State Department
memo dated 16 February 1976. In this cable from U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Robert Hill to
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for Latin America William Rogers,
the former relates a conversation between himself and Argentine Army Chief of Staff Roberto
Eduardo Viola. General Viola informs Hill that the military is actively crating a plan to manage
public relations in the event of their coming military coup. While Viola reveals that while some
executions would, “probably be necessary,'* the military wishes to,“minimize and resulting
problems with the U.S"(CIA Military Take Cognizance of Human Rights Issue 16 February
1976). Clearly, the United States was well informed of the coming actions to be taken by the
Argentine Armed Forces.
One of the later mentions of a coup by a United States official appears nearly two weeks
before the coup in a State Department communication from Michael J. Harrington. In a letter to
Henry Kissinger asking for help in securing the release of a jailed American teacher, Harrington
states that time is of the essence due to the, “...imminent threat of a right-wing coup"(CIA Olga
Talamante 12 March 1976). Once again, it is certain that United States officials were aware of
the possibility, and strong likelihood, of a coming military coup.
Fhe highest level of U.S. actions shown to have taken place before the coup on 24 March
1976 is shown in a memo from Ambassador Hill to Assistant Secretary of State William Rogers
on 16 March 1976, roughly a week before the coup. The former relates the details of a meeting
with the Argentine Navy Chief Emilio Massera. The full extent of United States help to the coup
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leaders consists of Hill's recommendations of reputable public relations firms which the military
may use in seeking to maintain good press in the United States following their seizure of power
(CIA Ambassador's Conversation with Admiral Massera 16 March 1976). The clear picture
painted by declassified U.S. documents shows the existence of an American feeling of support.
far from the instigation shown by United States actions in Brazil and Chile during previous
years.
The lack of U.S. involvement in the lead-up to the Argentine coup of 1976 could exist for
numerous reasons. Perhaps the American government was weary of the accusations and bad
press it had earned in its role in provoking the previous coups in Brazil and Chile and 1966 and
1973. respectfully. More likely is the fact that the Argentine coup was sufficiently motivated by
domestic factors. Also, the coups in Brazil and Chile were taken against fairly well entrenched
leaders w ho had a reasonable chance of establishing radical leftist governments in their
respective nations. In the Argentine case, both Juan and Isabel Peron were far from radical, and
had displayed meaningful efi'orts in combating the actions of far-left elements of the public. In
Argentina, United States interests were in less danger from the ruling administration. Thus, while
the United States had an interest in seeing a successful right-wing military coup, domestic
Argentine politics made the aggressive covert operations used in Chile unnecessary,
fhe Argentine coup of 1976 appears to have been the overthrow that was the least
influenced by the actions of the United States. This fact allows the Argentine coup to reveal the
importance of domestic factors in leading a military to take such major action in national politics.
T he Argentine coup demonstrates the importance of destabilizing domestic factors such as
political division and violence, economic crisis, and a civilian leadership which is opposed by the
military. With the severity of these factors’ affects on the Argentine nation, the military was

1
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likely molivaled to act regardless of the level of United States backing for their efforts. The
Argentine coup of 1976 is the one case in which United States responsibility for the overthrow is
simply not evident.

Chapter Five
Conclusions:
The military coups that took place in Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, and Argentina in
1976 were domestic events that were influenced to some extent by actions taken by the United
States. In the Brazilian case. United States actions were clearly important, while not completely
responsible for the coup launched by the military. The Chilean case of 1973 is the instance in
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which the United Stales appears to be the most involved, and thus, the most responsible for
provoking the coup. Finally, the Argentine case of 1976 exhibits the lowest level of activity by
the United Stales. With such a varying degree of United States involvement and responsibility,
the findings of this study are best determined on a case by case basis. In order to provide the best
explanation of the American role in provoking the coups, the hypotheses of this study should be
evaluated independently for each of the three military takeovers.
In the first chapter of this tliesis. the three hypotlieses presented were as follows:
First, United States actions towards the civilian governments preceding the military coups in
question were insufneient for causing the coups.
Second, domestic factors were most important in provoking the military coups in Brazil, Chile,
and Argentina.
Finally, perpetrators of the military coups would not have acted to overthrow their civilian
governments if not for a belief that the United States supported their actions.

In the case of the Brazilian coup of 1964. this first hypothesis is shown to have strong
support. United States actions follow ing the election of President Joao Goulart were largely
unchanged from the policies used before Goulart’s rise to power. Whereas the United States
immediately reacted negatively to a left-leaning president in Chile in 1973, the U.S. chose to
treat the Brazilian government of Goulart as if, “there has been no break in cordial relations
between the United States and Brazil.” Furthermore, the State Department recommended that the
Kennedy administration give Goulart a, “reasonable benefit of the doubt(Parker 1979, 7). With
this decision, the United Stales avoided initiating the policies of covert destabilization and
economic penalties exacted on leftist regimes in later years. This fact greatly lowers United
States responsibility for the coup.
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Even as the military coup approached, the United States appeared hesitant to take action
in supporting the right-wing military plotters. When Ambassador Gordon cabled a message
urging the United States to pledge support of arms, fuel, and other necessities to the coup
movement led by Branco on 27 March 1964. the response from Washington was unenthusiastic.
The follow ing day. the Johnson administration decided to assure Gordon that help would come in
some form if it was needed, but avoided agreeing to provide the requested materials for the coup
(CIA Telegram Bundy to President Johnson 28 March 1964). The same day, the State
Department asked Ambassador Gordon for more information on the coup effort being led by
Branco, but once more failed to communicate U.S. support for the effort. Indeed, it was not until
after a Cl A cable stated that the coup would likely “take place within a week”(CIA Cable on
Plotters 30 March 1 94) that the Johnson Administration expressed willingness to provide the
requested materials for Branco's coup effort. This decision to support the coup only came hours
before the overthrow took place (CIA Sect, of State Rusk to Amb. Gordon 31 March 1964).
Undoubtedly, the United States had some indication that a coup was possible and
probable but. United States actions towards provoking the coup were non-existent. In the
Brazilian case. United States actions towards the civilian government preceding the military
coup were the same as United States actions before Goulart came to power. Thus, there were no
meaningful efforts by the U.S. that could even begin to cause a coup. United States actions were
insufficient for causing the coup.
In the Chilean case, the idea that United States actions were insufficient for causing a
military coup appears to be poorly supported. Much like Brazil in 1966, many important
domestic issues were at work in provoking the military coup in Chile. However, the
overw helming efforts to undermine the Allende regime which were undertaken by the United
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States had an incredible impact on the coup. Nearly three years before the coup took place,
Henry Kissinger had already resolved that.'“We will not let Chile go down the drain(CIA Helms
to Kissinger 12 September 1970). Furthermore, by 15 September 1970, President Nixon had
given orders to '‘make the economy scream" and had authorized ten million dollars for efforts to
undermine Allcnde. with more money available if needed (CIA Notes on Meeting 15 September
1970). Over the course of the three years before the coup, the United States poured millions of
dollars and massive co\ ert manpower into undermining the Allende regime with letters to
conservative elements of the military, broadcasts to the public, newspapers, funding of political
groups, and severe economic penalties. Members of the United States government held meeting
in which they decided to sell United States copper reserves in order to damage the Chilean
economy, w'hich relied on copper profits for 80% of its exports. In the same meeting, they
resolved to bring Allende dow n through internal forces(CIA Memorandum of Conversation 6
November 1970). Finally, the Chilean military leadership of both Carlos Pratts and General
Schneider was against a coup out of respect for the Chilean constitution. Schneider was killed in
a failed kidnapping attempt by plotters who had held past communications with the Nixon
administration (Treverton 1996, 7). In June of 1973. General Prats blocked a coup attempt
against the Allende regime (Childress 48).The coup was only possible with the eventual
promotion of Augusto Pinochet as the head of the armed forces in August of the same year
(Huneeus 2007, 34).
The importance of United States efforts in successfully prompting the coup is evident
through the Nixon administration’s immediate resolve to remove Allende, the scale of United
States actions against the Allende regime, and the amount of time that elapsed before the coup
took place. Domestic factors were hugely important, but they did not reach a boiling point until
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nearly three > ears of American pressure had its efTect. Thus, support for the hypothesis that
United States actions against the regime preceding the coup were insufficient for causing the
coup is shak> at best. In the Chilean case, long-term, widespread pressure by the United States
was successful in prompting a militarv’ coup.
In the Argentine case, the insufficiency of U.S. actions in prompting a coup appears to be
true. As has been stated earlier, the Argentine case of 1976 was one in which the United States
had the lowest level of involvement. In fact, the highest level of U.S. involvement in the coup
came through Ambassador Hill's decision to provide the coup plotters with a list of public
relations firms which they might use after the coup(CIA Ambassador’s Conversation with
Admiral Massera 1 6 March 1 976). Outside of this decision, the United States was virtually
uninvolved in the Argentine coup. While the U.S. has been shown to support the idea of a coup
through providing information to its perpetrators, complicity is hardly responsibility. The U.S.
may have provoked a coup in Chile in 1973, but evidence fails to support such a statement about
the Brazilian coup of 1 964. or the Argentine coup of 1976.
In the Brazilian case, the second hypothesis, the idea that domestic factors were most
important in prompting a military coup is well supported. Brazil in 1964 was led towards a
military coup by three important factors which are common across all three coups. The
government was under the control of a president viewed suspiciously by the military, the
economy fell into major deterioration, and political unrest threatened national security. These
domestic factors were the most powerful in prompting the military coup of 1964.
Even before Goulart was inaugurated, the military opposed his presidency (Roett 1972,
7). By the time that the president regained his full presidential powers via a national plebiscite,
this apprehension felt by the military remained, if not stronger than before. The Presidency of
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Goulart was also marked by a major drop in economic growth and well-being. In 1962 gross
domestic product experienced negative growth (Roett 1972, 107). Under the leadership of
Goulart. this economic dow nturn continued. Finally, the military felt that national security was
threatened by the increasing number of left-wing leaders appointed to high posts, and Goulart’s
allegiance to the rebellious soldiers of the Sailor's Revolt. All ofthese factors were sufficient for
causing the miliiarv- to lake action via a coup on 31 March 1964. Domestic factors were the most
important motivations for the militarv coup.
The Chilean coup of 1973 also supports tlie idea that domestic events were most
important in causing the militarv’ coups in question. While opposition to Allende from the
militarv’, economic deterioration, and political upheaval were largely caused or exacerbated by
actions of the United Stales, the coup would not have taken place if these domestic conditions
had not existed in the first place. However, regardless of what force w'as behind the domestic
conditions for the coup, the existence of these destabilizing conditions was the most important
factor in provoking the military takeover.
My second hypothesis appears to be supported in the Argentine case as well. The
Argentine coup was caused by ineffective leadership, economic collapse, and political upheaval.
The death of .luan Peron further split the Peronist movement, brought his incompetent wife to
power, and led to a serious outbreak of violence. Indeed, inflation reached 354% during 1975
(Power 2002, 217) and as many as nine-hundred Argentine citizens were killed in political
violence in the same year (Power 2002, 617). U.S. involvement in the coup was extremely low
and; once again, the most important factors in provoking a coup were of domestic origin. It
seems clear that during the Cold War in the Southern Cone, domestic problems were the most
important factors in leading to military takeovers of civilian governments.

4.
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In the case of Brazil in 1964. the final hypothesis that the perpetrators ofthe military
coups would not have acted \s ithout the belief that the U.S. supported their actions would be best
examined w ith further research, but I suspect that United States support of the coup plotters’
actions w as very important to their decision to act. It is clear that the coup plotters associated
with the overthrow commanded bv General Gastello Branco were in contact with Ambassador
Gordon and active in seeking support in preparation for the coup days before they acted (CIA
Telegram Dept, of State to Gordon 28 March 1964). The idea that the coup plotters would seek
American support less than a w eek before launching the coup seems like late planning. If the
plotters had prepared enough to launch a successful coup on the 3T‘, it seems that United States
support for their actions was not an important factor since the first evidence of requests for such
appear on the 28"’. 1 believe that further declassification of U.S. documents would reveal earlier
requests for support.
My reason for leaning towards supporting my second hypothesis in the Brazilian case is
quite simple, fhe military coup under General Branco was launched on the same day that the
Johnson administration finally expressed willingness to support the efforts ofthe coup plotters
(CIA Sect, of State Rusk to Amb. Gordon 31 March 1964). It is possible that this is simply
coincidence, but it is particularly damning that the coup took place only hours after a repeated
request for possible material support, which had been communicated by an U.S. Ambassador in
contact with the coup plotters, w'as confirmed. It is hard ignore such a fact. While I believe that
further research and declassification is needed, 1 believe it is likely that the coup plotters would
not have acted without the expressed support of the United States.
Contrary to the necessity of speculation in the supporting this hypothesis in the Brazilian
case, the ('hilean coup of 1973 appears lo strongly support the idea that the coup plotters would

Weldy46

not have acted w iihout U.S. support. While Pinochet and others could have acted simply in an
effort to end the conditions that had been caused by U.S. pressure, they certainly knew that their
actions were supported and encouraged by the United States. It was likely quite obvious to
leaders of the coup that economic penalties imposed against the Allende government would end
along with his regime. Also, the United States had maintained constant contact with conservative
members of the military since September of 1970(CIA Memorandum of Conversation 6
November 1970). The conditions that prompted the coup would not have existed without the
actions of the United Slates, thus the coup plotters hoping to improve conditions were reliant on
U.S. support by default.
It appears that U.S. support for the coup plotters was instrumental in their decisions to
revolt in Brazil and Chile, but this hypothesis is poorly supported by facts surrounding the
military takeover in Argentina in 1976. While Admiral Massera and others certainly wished to
ensure that their coup was not condemned too harshly by the American media, this fact does not
prove that the plotters' decision was influenced by United States complicity. Surely, the plotters
were encouraged by the fact that the United Slates was in support of their effort, but I believe
that the severity of violence and the radical collapse of the political and economic system
resulted in a decision to seize power which could not have been halted by the U.S. Indeed, I
believe that one of the most important reasons that the United States did not take action to
provoke a coup was the fact that domestic conditions ensured that such actions by the U.S. were
not necessary. Conditions in Argentina had reached such a severe state by 1976 that the military
had resolved to act alone, only requesting public relations assistance from the U.S. The Argentine
stale was sufficienily threatened by poor leadership, economic failure, and political upheaval to a
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point w here w hich the military was resolved to act with or without support from the United
States.
In an overall look at the cases examined here, it appears that U.S. actions were
insufficient for causing coups in all cases except for the Chilean coup of 1973. domestic
conditions were the most important factors in causing the military takeovers in all three nations,
and the plotters of the coups in Brazil and Chile were reliant on some level of U.S. support for
their actions while the Argentine military was willing to act alone.
I'he hypothesis that United States actions were not sufficient for prompting military
coups in Brazil. Chile, and Argentina appears to be supported in two of the three cases. American
actions did not cause mililar>' takeovers in Brazil in 1964 or Argentina in 1976. This finding can
be helpful when used to examine Cold War coups in other nations around the world. It has been
shown that massive amounts of propaganda, economic penalties, covert funding, and other
actions by the United Slates are needed in order to prompt a coup in a nation such as Chile.
Without such large levels of involvement, one should be hesitant to hastily pin blame for military
coups on the United Stales or another dominant neighbor who may have an interest in seeing a
change in government. At least in the Southern Cone of South America, it seems that great
efforts, substantial periods of time, and the upmost of secrecy are all necessary for one nation to
force a military coup in another.
The difficulty of prompting a coup in another nation stems from the importance of
domestic factors in creating a coup environment. In all three cases examined in this document,
domestic factors such as a mistrusted or incompetent leadership, economic deterioration, and
political unrest have been the most important reasons for causing military coups. In Chile, these
conditions w ere exacerbated by United States actions, but like Brazil and Argentina, the military
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would have felt no need to act if not for increasingly severe domestic dilemmas. It is likely that
in the majorit\ of military coups around the world, the primary importance of domestic problems
will remain as

necessary condition for prompting military seizures of civilian governance.

While domestic factors are the most important in causing a military coup, smaller nations
will be likely to look to their larger allies for support before acting. In two ofthe three cases in
this paper, military leaders who were active in planning a takeover seemed to be significantly
preoccupied with gaining support from the United States before they took action. The Brazilian
coup of 1964 and the Chilean coup of 1973 follow this pattern. While the Argentine plotters had
implied support from the U.S. as evidenced by American compliance in suggesting a list of
public relations firms, they had already decided to act before asking for this favor. With the
severity of conditions in Argentina, it is highly probable that the plotters would have launched
their takeover with or without American support. Thus, this study suggests that the support ofa
larger ally is very important in prompting a military coup, but not a condition which may
overshadow the importance of responding to ever-worsening domestic conditions. It is important
to coup planners that strong allies support their actions, but they will likely act without such
support if they feel that inaction is no longer an option.
During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used various forms of
influence in order to sw'ay the actions of their smaller neighbors in hopes of preserving existing
interests or creating new advantages. In particular, it is true that the United States has been guilty
of prying into domestic events in Latin America far before the advent ofthe Cold War. Part of the
legacy of American involvement in Latin America is the controversial role of the United States in
encouraging and supporting military coups in the Southern Cone and Brazil. Many sources are
divided on the level of U.S. fault in provoking coups in nations such as Brazil, Chile, and
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Argentina, but an examination of what factors are required for military coups is helpful in
grading the level of American liability. In respect to the conditions which are necessary for a
military coup, all three cases here suggest that a civilian leadership not trusted by the military,
economic collapse, and political upheaval are the main factors that lead to a takeover of civilian
government. While the United States held some level of knowledge or complicity in the coups
examined here, it appears that forcing a coup required massive levels of involvement which were
only present in the Chilean case of 1973. Outside of Chile, the evidence shows that U.S. actions
were not exclusively responsible for the coups. Even within the Chilean case, U.S. involvement
alone was insufficient for causing a coup. The coups were inspired overwhelmingly by domestic
events which led military leaders to act after assuring that their biggest ally was in support of
their takeover.
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